The Effectiveness of Psychological Nudges in Charity Marketing

From Rational Choice to Behavioural Influence: The Role of Psychological Nudges in Charity Marketing

Background

Literature on decision-making has been dominated for decades by the idea that humans are highly rational in this process (Uzonwanne, 2022). The term rational in this context has several layers of meaning, including the propensity to evaluate different options, establish the desired and acceptable ratio of costs to benefits, and maintain choice preferences over time (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). This assumption was challenged in many experiments fighting the neoclassical decision-making models (McCaughey & Bruning, 2010; Maes & Faber, 2020). These attempts resulted in alternative explanations, which highlight that, while people do aim to satisfy their goals, they are significantly less consistent in the ways they approach their overarching goal (Uzonwanne, 2022). The research on nudges, including psychological nudges, emerged from the attempts to create a link between people’s decision-making and general welfare, prompting researchers to study how and why people make decisions that (do not) contribute to their welfare (Just, 2017). The relevance of psychological nudges to charity marketing is underlined by the detailed characteristics of the nudge theory and its origins. The original purpose of research on nudges was to introduce desirable forms of behaviour, and positive behaviour in general, which is why the theory was first applied to financial decision-making and public policy (Lee & Chu, 2023). Some examples of seminal works were conducted on the role of nudges in people’s decisions regarding personal savings and contributions to pension funds (Lee & Chu, 2023). Over time, the field of application expanded, and now it involves commercial contexts as well, but the relationship to prosocial behaviours and other forms of desirable behavioural patterns remains (Lee & Chu, 2023).

This article aims to introduce the concept of nudges and offer a solid theoretical basis for understanding this concept. As a part of this objective, the following sections will also outline the benefits of nudges in general before delving into the application of nudges in the context of marketing. The practical value of this article is supported by examples of different psychological nudges and how they can be applied in the context of charity marketing. Due to the ever-increasing importance of digital environments, a section of this article discusses the effects of digital psychological nudges. Finally, because charity marketing is held to a higher ethical standard and the use of nudges has been somewhat controversial, the article closes with a brief discussion on the ethics of psychological nudges and how any shortcomings can be addressed.

The concept of nudges

The concept of nudges was developed in 2008 by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). The term refers to “a diverse set of instruments that utilise behavioural insights in order to affect individual behaviour, without limiting options or significantly changing economic incentives” (Bruns et al., 2018, p. 41). While the term was coined in 2008, it draws on decades of research on behavioural economics and, according to its authors, it was the matter of its formalisation rather than true invention (Bruns et al., 2018). The nudge theory served as the basis for supporting the broader concept of libertarian paternalism, which advocates that policymaking can achieve its goals through nudging rather than using mechanisms of coercion and punishment (Cai, 2019). The previously mentioned contexts of pension funds and personal savings were particularly interesting to researchers and practitioners, and nudges were positioned as a powerful alternative to the already existing strategies. However, because attempts to elicit positive behaviours are not novel, the nudge theory acknowledges that the formalisation of this concept, at times, simply offered a systematisation of existing strategies. According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008), any decision-making scenario inevitably contains nudges, even if that was not the overt intention of those who created it. In addition to referring to the wide presence of nudges, the theory also highlighted the level of their impact. Because nudges are usually focused on contextual factors, in most cases, they are focused on affecting automatic behaviours and beliefs (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). It should be noted that the conceptualisation of nudges offered by other authors does not limit itself to nudges that only target automatic behaviours (Hobbs, 2017). This approach is partly ethically motivated because nudges that target automatic behaviours are also seen as attempts at bypassing conscious decision-making, which raises ethical concerns (Hobbs, 2017).

When the nudge theory was developed, special attention was given to the importance of distinguishing between nudges and other practices utilised to influence people’s decision-making (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudges are meant to be perceived as non-threatening and non-coercive (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The assumption behind this baseline characteristic is that people should be presented with an extended choice set but should not feel pressured to make a particular choice, otherwise, it would not be regarded as a nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The added assumption is that nudges should be easily avoidable and non-costly (not just financially, but also in terms of time, mental energy, and other resources) to ignore (Sürücü et al., 2019). This characteristic of nudges has been somewhat debated by other authors who pointed out that this assumption implies that people’s preferences for particular choices are so strong that they would not be affected by nudges (Sürücü et al., 2019). However, this is rarely the case, and the effects of different nudges, such as decoy or dominant options, are not observable solely when an individual has a strong and pre-determined preference for a singular option (Sürücü et al., 2019). It is also very common that, when it comes to a large number of decisions, decision-makers tend to have no preference for any of the choices because they lack knowledge on the subject or have no interest in it, which is why many people choose the default option presented to them (Cronqvist et al., 2018). Furthermore, it will be shown in this article that some nudges are reliant on creating an impression that choosing the nudged option is more efficient for an individual, while going against the most obvious choice requires additional effort.

Who benefits from nudges?

The original theory did not explain who benefits from nudges. However, researchers interested in this subject classified nudges into three groups according to this criterion: nudges that benefit the individual, nudges that benefit the society (or contribute to the general welfare), and nudges that benefit the nudger (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). Pro-self nudges are most commonly used in the policy context and are meant to prevent individuals from making irrational and self-destructive decisions. The original nudge theory encompassed this type of nudge (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). Examples include nudges related to pension savings, financial literacy, or health-related choices (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). These nudges can vary greatly in complexity and underlying psychological mechanisms. One of the frequently cited nudges is favouring health-related behaviours through specific food arrangements in canteens that allow easier access to healthier foods. Not only that each of these nudges intended to benefit the decision-maker, but there is also an implicit expectation that the person making a decision would perceive the nudge as beneficial (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). However, whether or not the existence of a nudge should be communicated and what effects this might have on their efficacy will be discussed in the context of ethical concerns and the issue of transparency.

Pro-social nudges, also called social or pro-others nudges, constitute the second category. These are nudges that are meant to direct individuals towards making decisions that benefit society and contribute to the group welfare (Nagatsu, 2015). In this case, neither the decision-maker nor the nudger benefits directly from the decision, but it can be argued that the benefits of living in a more just, financially efficient, or healthier society are relevant to everyone (Nagatsu, 2015). Examples of nudges that fall under this category are, for example, nudges aimed at facilitating regular and timely tax payments and participating in sustainable practices (John & Blume, 2018; Allcott & Rogers, 2012). Research demonstrated that the mere information about energy consumption and comparison of energy consumption across families living in the same area had positive effects on sustainable energy consumption practices (Allcott & Rogers, 2012). Charity donations and charitable behaviour also fall under this category, as benefactors or nudges are identified groups or individuals that are neither the decision-makers nor the ones designing the decision-making scenarios (Pittarello et al., 2019). However, it should be noted that the extent of literature on issues such as taxation or energy consumption far outweighs literature on charity behaviours and donations.

The third group of nudges consists of nudges benefiting the nudgers (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). Among the three groups of nudges, this is considered to be their most controversial form due to ethical implications and concerns associated with the for-benefit and often for-profit nudging practices. According to some authors, most marketing techniques can be considered nudges (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). This observation is based on the underlying principle of marketing methods where free choice in terms of decision-making is preserved, but organisations put efforts into steering consumers towards the preferred option or solution (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). In order to distinguish between marketing strategies and nudges, the criterion of the benefit to the decision-maker is reintroduced. According to this classification, marketing strategies count as nudges as long as they also benefit the decision-maker, including personal and social benefits (Congiu & Moscati, 2020). This criterion was adopted in the present article, and it was further coupled with the intentional selection of strategies that are also applied as nudges outside marketing. The motivation behind this decision was to provide an overview of marketing strategies that are native and unique to the nudge theory.

Psychological nudges in charity marketing

The use of dominant and decoy options

Several key underlying principles of the nudge theory are supposed to be closely observed regardless of the context in which nudges are applied. Firstly, nudges should not restrict options at a decision-maker's disposal (Hansen, 2016). The choice set can be expanded by adding additional options, and this strategy is successfully pursued when organisations add dominant options or so-called decoys to direct individuals to make the best choice (Hansen, 2016). However, the practice should never result in decision-makers having a narrower choice set and feeling restricted when making a decision; otherwise, the strategy is no longer considered a nudge (Hansen, 2016). Seminal research studies were conducted on this subject, examining how individuals make decisions, and examples of different subscription forms were used (Kivetz et al., 2004). In this famous experiment, participants were given a choice between an online subscription for $59, a print subscription for $125, and an online and print subscription for $125 (Kivetz et al., 2004). The fact that the last two options were priced at the same level, but the third option offered more benefits than the second one, meant that the majority of people would opt for the third option. In this case, the third subscription plan dominated the choice between available options.

A similar strategy can be applied to charity marketing, where people can be provided with various options for monthly donations. For example, one option might entail a £20 monthly donation, and the second option might include a £40 monthly donation. In contrast, the third option might include a £40 monthly donation with access to community events. The additional benefits can come in different forms, depending on the nature of a charity, and range from a monthly newsletter to more substantial but non-financial benefits. The goal is to nudge people to choose a monthly donation that is higher than the minimum while providing them with benefits accompanying that choice. Research confirms this recommendation, as the experiment conducted by Kivetz et al. (2004) was replicated in the context of charity. The study showed that using a decoy (a visibly inferior option) positively affected charity-related decisions as people tended to donate more (Pittarello et al., 2019). Even more so, when presented with an option to not donate at all, the presence of a decoy steered people to decide on the most favourable donation (Pittarello et al., 2019). While the previous example in this paragraph shows the use of pro-self nudges, the research in question demonstrated that people also favour pro-social nudges (Pittarello et al., 2019). Their decision-making was informed by the motivation to create maximum positive effects for the benefactors of a donation (Pittarello et al., 2019). This type of nudge can be effectively applied to scenarios when fixed donation amounts are offered as options.

The use of defaults

Defaults are one of the most discussed psychological nudges with empirically confirmed effects in a number of fields, ranging from organ donation to consumer product configurations. The term refers to externally configured values that an individual receives or chooses unless done otherwise (Van Gestel et al., 2020). The efficacy of this nudge is so extensive that the term “default effects” refers to the changes in people’s decision-making based on the presence of a default value or option (Van Gestel et al., 2020). In the context of charity donations, defaults are understood as choice options because, unless in cases of subscriptions, people cannot be compelled to choose an option automatically (Goswami & Urminsky, 2016). Extensive empirical research consisting of a series of experiments was conducted to determine whether including a default option would affect donation behaviour. Variables that were taken into account included the donation rate, average donation amount, and the resulting revenue (Goswami & Urminsky, 2016). It should be noted that, prior to the study in question, results on this subject offered contradictory results. Some studies found that a high default positively impacted charity revenue; some reported the same effect for a low default, while some studies reported no effects of defaults. The study in question demonstrated that low defaults correlated with an increased donation rate and reduced the average donation rate (Goswami & Urminsky, 2016). The study also found that, when relying on other nudges simultaneously, introducing defaults reduced the visibility of other nudges (Goswami & Urminsky, 2016).

Following the quoted study, it can be suggested to the charities that the use of a specific default strategy should be contingent on several conditions. Low defaults can be utilised when a charity aims at a broad audience and aims to collect as many donations as possible. High defaults should be utilised (or low defaults avoided) when the goal is to collect donations of a higher value. This holds especially true when considering defaults in scenarios where high-net-worth donors are targeted. Finally, it is not recommended that defaults are used in combination with other nudges, especially when positive information about charity is presented (Goswami & Urminsky, 2016). Some studies also suggest that the use of defaults has a limited to no impact on aggregate donation levels, but that co-donation levels increase with default amounts (Altmann et al., 2019). This has prompted another recommendation worth considering that charities can rely on data to provide personalised recommended defaults instead of using the same default presented to all potential donors (Altmann et al., 2019). In either case, pursuing the strategy of defaults would also represent a form of differentiation, as this financial structure is rarely adopted by charities (Hobbs, 2017).

Opting out is going against the status quo

This nudge is based on the status quo bias, which refers to the general preference for conditions to stay as they are (Godefroid et al., 2022). Research on decision-making found that people’s behaviour can be steered in the desired direction when, at the point of making a decision, they need to communicate that their choice is different from the one that is presented to them (Godefroid et al., 2022). Research on organ donors illustrates the efficacy of this strategy, showing that countries where being an organ donor is an option by default and those who object to it need to explicitly opt out have significantly higher rates of organ donors (Etheredge, 2021). The positive effect of the option to opt out was also demonstrated in relation to charitable giving. It was found that donations increased by 25% compared to the conditions when individuals had to choose to become donors actively (Zarghamee et al., 2017). The strong effect of this nudge is ascribed to the impact of framing in combination with the tendency among people to side with the proposed option when they need to decide on the spot (Zarghamee et al., 2017). Furthermore, pursuing the option of opting out of the proposed course of action seems like a more labour-intensive decision, thus prompting people to choose the option already offered to them and making it easier to execute (Zarghamee et al., 2017). This strategy is considered to be somewhat difficult to implement among charities, mostly because of the financial structures necessary to support it (Zarghamee et al., 2017). However, there are examples of successful options that other charities can pursue: partnering with shops and supermarket chains to round up the bill and donate the change to a designated charity or cause, partnering with restaurants to add a fixed small amount to each bill, or adding a small surcharge to a price of a ticket to an event/visit. In each of these cases, it is important that individuals are aware that they can decline the option to be charged the proposed charitable donation.

Social norms nudge

Social norms nudge consists of providing information about the behaviour of other people with the intent of eliciting the same behaviour in the decision-maker (Kantorowicz‐Reznichenko & Kantorowicz, 2021). The efficacy of the social norms nudges seems to be dependent on the context, both in terms of the targeted behaviour and the cultural context in which it is applied (Kantorowicz‐Reznichenko & Kantorowicz, 2021). This conclusion is supported by contradictory evidence from studies reporting high levels of efficacy in some contexts, such as tax compliance, and low levels of efficacy in other contexts, such as payment of tuition fees (Kantorowicz‐Reznichenko & Kantorowicz, 2021). A common social norm nudge used in charity marketing is providing information about donations made by other people (Gråd et al., 2021). Research shows that social norm nudges are successful in facilitating donations, thus making them a viable strategy for charity marketing (Gråd et al., 2021). Perceived manipulation does not diminish this effect (Gråd et al., 2021). A portion of the population tends to react negatively to this kind of nudge because they see it as manipulative. However, their desire to engage in prosocial behaviour does not decrease even when this perception exists (Gråd et al., 2021). However, there is evidence that transparency surrounding this nudge can facilitate the opposite behaviour. An experimental study demonstrated that once people were made aware of the mechanism behind the social norms nudge, they would not engage in the desired behaviour, and this effect was limited to male participants (Kantorowicz‐Reznichenko & Kantorowicz, 2021). When presented transparently, the inhibitory effect of this nudge was attributed to people’s desire to “not follow the herd” (Kantorowicz‐Reznichenko & Kantorowicz, 2021). Hence, it is recommended that charities reconsider using the social norms nudge under the conditions when transparency is prioritised.

Friction nudge

The friction nudge can have two forms. One form consists of removing obstacles to reaching a decision, which is usually reflected in simplifying the process of conducting the desired course of action (Gråd et al., 2021). In the digital context, this translates to being able to complete an action or a transaction with as few steps as possible (Gråd et al., 2021). The other form consists of intentionally adding friction into the decision-making design, and this can be achieved both in the digital and offline environments (Bertini et al., 2024). While the latter option seems counterintuitive, some researchers argue that adding friction has long-term positive effects because it prolongs the amount of time that potential consumers spend debating different options, thus inevitably increasing their engagement levels (Bertini et al., 2024). So far, this nudge has not been researched in the context of charity marketing and donation behaviour. However, insights from the research on user interface design might provide some insight into the subject. It seems that, at least when it comes to digital environments, people prefer a combination of continuity and discontinuity, as this is what provides an optimal level of perceived control, further leading to overall consumer satisfaction (Ash et al., 2018). Hence, a combination of friction removal and intentionally friction-informed design might produce optimal results, as processes that are overly simple or overly complicated might have countereffects (Ash et al., 2018).

Moral nudges

Moral nudges often come in the form of questions, asking potential donors to think about the morality of their decision or offering a blanket question (e.g., Do you want to help abandoned and abused animals?) to which either answer is considered to be morally charged (Gråd et al., 2021). According to some authors, moral nudges are more effective when presented in a format that elicits an affective reaction (e.g., an emotional reaction to the realisation that the chosen course of action is not aligned with one’s moral standards) (Hobbs, 2017). This type of effect exists because moral judgements are, to a great extent, affective (Hobbs, 2017). Due to the central role of affect in moral judgments, information nudges, which appeal to people’s moral deliberation, are significantly less effective because they block the emotional response and overemphasise deliberative elements (Hobbs, 2017). Not only can examples of questions be presented in a way that elicits an emotional response fueled by one’s moral beliefs, but it also appeals to a sense of empathy, solidarity and a sense of concern, all of which further amplify the desired effects (Hobbs, 2017). Similarly to social nudges, moral nudges also positively affect donations, while they do not affect people who perceive moral nudges as manipulative (Gråd et al., 2021). Another important finding that applies to social and moral nudges is that, when they are present, people tend to perceive other people’s behaviour as less genuine, but this does not apply to assessing one’s own behaviour (Gråd et al., 2021).

The effects of psychological nudges in digital environments

Compound effects of multiple nudges

Considering that charities, like most organisations, are moving their activities, at least partially, to the digital realm, researchers have also explored the effects of psychological nudges in the context of digitally procured donations (Bergram et al., 2024). In general, the effects of nudges seem to apply to the digital context as well, with some studies indicating that the use of several nudges at the same time amplifies their effect (Bergram et al., 2024). However, one study recorded that the more extensive use of multiple digital nudges was associated with a heightened feeling of being manipulated, contributing to negative feelings following a donation (Bergram et al., 2024). This finding contrasts with other studies indicating that people who perceive nudges as manipulative tend not to be affected by them, either negatively or positively (Gråd et al., 2021).

Charity email marketing and psychological nudges

An interesting study was conducted to determine whether charities can utilise nudges as a part of their email marketing strategies to garner new donors or ensure that occasional donors become regular. The study focused on 10 common nudges: social comparison, disclosure, friction reduction, feedback, anchor, default, warning, precommitment, decoy, and scarcity (Durst & Lauhoff, 2025). The list of nudges was expanded to include the identification coherence nudge, which was developed based on the cognitive biases relevant to charitable behaviour, including the identified victim bias and the victim number bias (Durst & Lauhoff, 2025). The study showed that the two most effective strategies when it comes to email charity marketing are the phantom decoy nudge and the identification coherence nudge (Durst & Lauhoff, 2025). The phantom decoy nudge includes a “phantom” option in the lineup of available options (Durst & Lauhoff, 2025). For example, five donation amounts can be offered as options, and one can be marked as unavailable at the moment. The Experimental method demonstrated that using a phantom decoy results in a greater possibility of an individual choosing the desired option. The identification coherence nudge consists of featuring a specific appeal, highlighting a person or a group requiring help and providing identifiable information about them (Durst & Lauhoff, 2025). The two described nudges resulted in the highest click-through rates on the recurring donations button (Durst & Lauhoff, 2025), showing strong evidence that these nudges are of particular importance to email charity marketing efforts.

The ethics of psychological nudges

As the application of psychological nudges has spread across different areas of human activity, including spheres such as health and policymaking, researchers and practitioners expressed concerns about the ethics of using nudges to guide people’s behaviour (Marchiori et al., 2017). The majority of the debate about the use of nudges has been confined to academic circles; however, studies on researching public opinion are emerging. One such study found that people scoring higher on individualism tend to perceive nudges as intrusive, while those scoring higher on analytical thinking tend to be more accepting (Hagman et al., 2015). Additionally, people report that, in general, they are not against policies allowing the use of nudges, but when presented with specific policies, they perceive them as intrusive (Hagman et al., 2015). When it comes to the ethics of using nudges, the public seems to be most concerned with the issue of how intrusive nudges are to an individual’s freedom of choice (Hagman et al., 2015).

One of the suggested strategies for bridging the gap between using nudges and ensuring that they are not impeding people’s right to free choice is to add disclaimers in some form. One of the central themes in this line of research is whether the transparency around using nudges would negatively impact their effectiveness, thus essentially introducing the choice between transparency and efficacy (Marchiori et al., 2017). Research has resolved this dilemma by demonstrating that transparency does not affect the effectiveness of nudges, and this finding is consistent in relation to different forms of transparency (Bruns et al., 2016). However, it is interesting to note that transparency does not affect people’s perception of autonomy and satisfaction with decision-making (Wachner et al., 2020). This is contrary to expectations that transparent communication around nudges would positively affect people’s view of them (Wachner et al., 2020). Additionally, there were no effects on the feeling of pressure, as experimental conditions with and without transparency produced low levels of pressure to choose the nudged option (Wachner et al., 2020). While researchers do not discourage the application of transparency principles when it comes to nudging, results like these indicate that organisations, including charities, should not expect additional benefits from adopting them.

Conclusion

The research on psychological nudges in relation to charity marketing and donation behaviour is limited. The majority of existing literature on decision-making is relevant to economic contexts and welfare, which reduces the transferability of findings and conclusions. This article attempted to summarise the available charity-specific knowledge while also providing a more general account of psychological nudges and the theory behind them. So far, the applicability of many nudges has been confirmed across different industries and types of behaviour, prompting the belief that some of the existing recommendations can also be applied to charity marketing. It was of specific interest to review digital nudges, and the emergence of a somewhat different pattern of efficacy levels strongly suggests that further research is needed to validate whether the results obtained in offline settings can be duplicated in digital contexts. Finally, unlike other topics presented in this publication, the subject of nudges is associated with a higher number of contradictory results. These contradictions cannot be resolved at the moment, but their existence is a reminder that the knowledge on this subject needs to be updated as new relevant studies emerge.

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